0. Introduction:Note:{This is African Union Students' Council(AUSC)" For The Better Africa We Deserve" Special Dedication to Our United States of America(U.S.A)based Amazing Word Ministries International YouTube Channel deleted by YouTube Team to please Allow You All Globally To Read, Analyze,Copy,Paste and Share this Link to At Least 7 Peoples online and offline:[ http://www.africanunionsc.org/2021/07/urukundo-rwa-benshi-ruzakonja-kutandura.html?m=1 ].
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Audio in Kinyarwanda on Tamperance against Tests and Covid-19 Vaccines[https://voca.ro/1chD3IsuMQa7 ].
1.The aim of this article is to bring the whole world to the reality that reveals the accuracy of the Divine Visions given to Madam Ellen Gould White concerning the interpretation of the Bible Prophecy regarding the Mark of the Beast(U.S.National Sunday Rest by Law named Here as The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021(Download A PDF Document Copy) as described in Revelation 13:1-18 and Revelation 14:9-12 and Revelation 15:1-18 and Revelation 16:1-21 and Revelation 20:1-15 and Daniel Chapter 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 12, pleading to the Closing of global probation and outpouring of the 7 Last Plagues in the Year 2024 within which will be the 2nd coming of Jesus Christ Our Lord of the 7th Day Holy Sabbath during the 7th Last Plague on Tuesday-October 15th, 2024 at 1:59' a.m.'''
2.Almighty Gord has sent in this Earth His only begotten Son Michael to be incarnated to become a Fresh Human being like You and Me under a Prophesied Name of Jesus Christ the Messiah in order to link the Divine unseen Heavenly inhabitants with Our Earthly Seen Inhabitants from the whole World, at arrival through the Virgin Mary who later married Joseph was born raised baptized in deep Jordan River and anointed as Messiah in the Year 27 A.D at Age 30 Years Old and began His Messianic Gospel preaching to fix on this earth the Kingdom of Grace of Almighty God in the Hearts of Sinners who were once the servants of SATAN in different ways, successfully Messiah who prophetically had to be killed crucified on the cross also who had to be resurrected in 3 Days and later to be taken back to Heaven to administer a Highest priest duty in the Heavenly Sanctuary for all existed human beings , has left His 12 Disciples in Jerusalem with a given order to proclaim the Gospel to Jerusalem and then to the whole World, and in that process ,He sent the Holy Spirit to continue His work to help the Christ's Early Church members to partake with Jesus Christ in finishing His Highest Priest duties being in the Heavenly Sanctuary.
3. With clear evidences, the Gospel of Jesus Christ of Nazareth was successfully disseminated worldwide from His when Her Mother received the Vision by Angel Gabriel until the Birth and of John the Baptist who later Baptized Jesus Christ in 27 A.D and Jesus Christ training 12 Disciples has fixed the Christ' Church Foundation, which was strengthen by the descending of the Holy Spirit from Almighty God after resurrection and ascending of Jesus Christ in Heaven in 31 A.D.
4. The disciples preached for 3 Years and Half in Jerusalem from 31 A.D to 34 A.D when they were severely persecuted and killed some of them including Deacon Stephen which led the rest to flee from Jerusalem to other nearby cities and non Jewish communities, finally with the conversion of Paul the Apostle, the Gospel of Jesus Christ reached Italy in the City of Rome where a Church of Christ was fixed and was headed by a Bishop of Rome whose duties included to teach the Truth of keeping the 7th Day Sabbath Holy and keeping all other 10 Commandments of Almighty God with careful attentions about the Prophesied 2nd Coming of Jesus Christ the Lord of the 7th Day Holy Sabbath, unfortunately , the Bishop of Rome became corrupted in the Years 317-321 decided to accept the false repentance and conversion of Ancient Pagan Roman Emperor Constantine who has turned down the whole Truth about the 7th Day Sabbath into worshiping the Sun god on Sundays and a Universal Sunday Law was enacted by Emperor Constantine from March 3rd-7th, 321 which was supported by the corrupted Bishops until they reversed the aim of the Church of Jesus Christ turning it into a Roman Catholic Church of Rome and on March 7th, 2021 it has celebrated its 1700th Anniversary.
5. Meanwhile, during the dark ages from 538 A.D until 1798 the Roman Catholic Church exercised the so called Holy Roman Empire Global Leadership over all existed Nations especially in the whole Europe, Part of Asian and African Continent will all inhabitants deceived to honor Sunday as a True Rest and Worship Day commanded by Almighty God in Heaven, falsely advocated by the Priests was once betrayed and exposed by Germany Priest Martin Luther who initiated the Protestantism in a Reformation Movement He started from October 31st, 1517.
6. The reformation of Martin Luther and other Protestant Reformers identified the Roman Catholic Church Popes as the Satanic System of ANTICHRIST which was Prophesied in the Holy Bible, especially in the 2 Thessalonians 2:1-7, Daniel 7:1-28 and Revelation 13:1-18 , continuously disseminated worldwide and from Europe Persecuted due to teaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ from the Holy Bible they found refuge in the New World then named United States of America (USA).
7. Therefore, beginning from the Adventists Movement of William Miller during the Years 1837-1844, Jesus Christ raised a Prophet Ellen Gould Harmon who later Married Mr. James White with home they believed the entrance of Jesus Christ in the Most Holy Apartment of Heavenly Sanctuary on October 22nd, 1844 and given many accurate Divine Visions among which on the 7th Day Holy Sabbath on April 3rd, 1847 Jesus Christ revealed to Madam Ellen Gould White the significance of the 7th Day Holy Sabbath as the exceptional 4th Commandment of Almighty God by which during the final Years of the Closing of Earth History the Antichrist will coordinate the fulfilling of the Biblical enforcement of the Mark of the Beast which She explained as A National Sunday Law to come to combat Climate Change in All Nations while this will be a final tool to be used by SATAN to deceive many inhabitants of this Earth to reject the Seal of Almighty God which is the 7th Day Holy Sabbath and the Former and Latter Rain Holy Spirit, while the Mark of the Beast revealed to Madam Ellen Gould White has been making its way in Darkness from Roman Catholic Church Jesuit Pope Francis' Satanic Encyclical Letter Laudato SI'237' made engulfed by the worldwide Nations under United Nations (UN) multilateral Paris Climate Agreement signed by many Nations on December 12th, 2015 expected United States of America (USA) which previous Administration rejected the Thoughts of a Pope of Rome leading to Jesuits Catholic politicians in the USA to elect their Puppet Jesuit influenced USA President Joe Biden and had signed for the the Paris Climate Agreement on His 1st Day of His Administration on January 20th, 2021 with all the following steps to enforce that Mark of the Beast from U.S.A Paris Climate Change Signing to elevation of Climate Change on USA National Security Emergency Consideration on January 27th, 2021, and then bringing the real issue to the Senators for U.S.A National Climate Act Congress Registration on April 19th, 2021 and dissemination of the U.S.A Registered National Climate Act Enactement plan by April 22nd, 2021 to the world Governments Leaders during the Biden Climate Summit which aims to bring the Mark of the Beast from USA to the Global Nations by Law.
I. Online Recorded USA Climate Change Congress Bills and Senators resolutions birthing the USA National Climate Emergency Sunday Rest by Law.
1.Jesus has revealed through Ellen Gould White visions that the Mark of the Beast will be enacted from the United States of America(USA) as a National Sunday Law.
2.Therefore, the enactment of the USA National Climate Act generated through USA Senator and His Team by the USA President Joe Biden is definitively to be considered as the enactment of the USA National Sunday Law waiting for its National Enforcement and thereafter its Global Nations Enforcement through USAID by the USA Embassies worldwide as it is planned basing to the below published USA Congressional Records on this Climate Change Crisis subject, while signing the Paris Climate Agreement on January 20th, 2021 by USA President Joe Bidden and Making the Climate Change A USA National Emergency through signing its related Executive Order on January 27th, 2021 is considerable to Signing the USA National Sunday Law, making the USA President Speaking like a Dragon through the USA Congress.
3.The Universal Sunday Law(Mark of the Beast) is coming with Biden hidden in the United States of America(USA) Congressional Records below and will have to follow the 4 Stages prophesied by Madam Ellen Gould White as described herein:
A. Four Stages of the National Sunday Law as a Mark of the Beast named The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021.Download A PDF Document Copy.
Stage I: Refrain from working on Sunday;
Step by step below is described USA Jesuit's Senators scenarios on how this stage I is coming hidden in the USA Congressional records from January 25th, 2021 introduced in the USA Congress by Mr.WHITEHOUSE, Mr.ScHumer,.. initiated from USA President Joe Biden's Signing of Paris Climate Agreement on Day 1 of His Administration on January 20th, 2021, this was illegal and unlawful and it had to be reshaped by the USA Congress, hardly below You will see how Climate Change was introduced in the USA Congress! Now it has been making its way in darkness but it is coming very soon to be enacted from USA President as a USA National Climate Act Bill to beginning enforcing Sunday Climate Lockdowns in USA and worldwide in all Nations under USA Embassies through USAID. 1.The Paris Climate Agreement.Download A PDF Document Copy ,2.Laudato SI'237'.Download A PDF Document Copy, 3. Fratelli Tutti.Download A PDF Document Copy, 4. Kigali Amendment on Montreal Protocols.Download A PDF Document Copy.
The Law of Sunday Rest and Worship to protect the Environment and this Earth is a Satanic Biblically Prophesied Nature Worship to be worldwide enforced with a persecution and death penalty draconian measures to begin from the USA in the framework involved SATAN(the Dragon) with its 1st Beast(Vatican Pope Francis Administration) to the 2nd Beast(USA Biden Administration) was transferred from Pope Francis to Joe Biden through Acceptance and adherence to Laudato Si' Climate Sunday Law on its Paragraph 237' in a hidden agenda in the United Nations (UN) Paris Climate Agreement and World Religions Alliance (WRA) as Climate Sunday Rest and Worship.
1)CLIMATE CHANGE; Signing of UN Paris Climate Agreement by USA President Joe Biden on January 20th, 2021 opened the Trump Locked doors for the USA Congress allowing Jesuit Pope Francis' Senators to start working of Climate Change issues from January 25th, 2021 on behalf of Pope Francis' Laudato SI'237' through USA President Joe Biden to be soon implemented Globally under supervision of USAID and USA Embassies worldwide in all Nations undergoing Enforcement of the Mark of the Beast named The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021.
2)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 14(Senate - January 25, 2021)January 25, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 14 — Daily Edition,117th Congress (2021 - 2022) - 1st Session:CLIMATE CHANGE by Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Madam President, I have hastened to the floor because I was upstairs, waiting for the House managers to bring the article over, and I heard my friend, the distinguished Senator from Alaska, talking about his concern about the fossil fuel part of the energy sector and his dissatisfaction with what the Secretary of the Treasury was able to assure him of in that regard.
I just wanted to note that I missed a moment of the Senator's remarks when I came walking down here, but as best as I could tell, the Senator never mentioned the term ``climate change,'' and he never referenced ``carbon emissions.'' I have to say, if we are going to deal with our energy sector, we have to deal with it in a way that takes into account carbon emissions and climate change. You can't just whistle past those things and pretend that they are not real and act as if we can continue to go forward in the way we always have--releasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, poisoning our oceans with acidification, warming the planet, and putting coastal communities like mine at grave risk from sea level rise and storm surge. We have to address those things.[[Page S124]]
As we go forward in this new Congress, I very much hope that my friend Senator Sullivan and I will be able to work together to address that exact problem to make sure that not only is our energy mix strong for our economy but to make absolutely sure that we are not sacrificing the safety of our planet, the economic security of our future generations, and the health of people all around the planet who have, really, no choice but to live close to the land and feel the pounding of climate change in their immediate lives every day. We have to address those things, and I hope we will.
3)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 16(Senate - January 27, 2021): Signing of USA Climate Action Executive Order by President Joe Biden on January 27th, 2021:Congressional record by Mr.Schumer" In my view, President Biden should consider the declaration of a national emergency on climate change".From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]: CLIMATE CHANGE by Mr. SCHUMER. On climate, today President Biden is set to announce a slew of Executive actions on climate, including critical measures to increase the conservation of Federal lands, reduce oil and gas development, and[[Page S158]]place environmental justice, green jobs, and, yes, science at the heart of our Nation's climate policy.
I think Americans are saying: Welcome back, science. We are glad you are playing a role in the decisions we make and not being ignored and trampled on like the previous administration did. Understanding that the United States cannot defeat a global threat on its own, the Biden administration has already wisely joined the Paris accords and will also propose convening an international climate summit this year, on Earth Day.
These Executive actions are a very strong opening push by the Biden administration to refocus our Nation's energy toward the threat of climate change. President Biden's commitment to deal with climate change is unquestioned. He is off to a fast start, and it couldn't come soon enough.
The Federal Government has a great deal of power to set the direction for our Nation's energy and environmental policy, but climate change represents an existential threat to our country and our planet. Every tool in the toolbox should be brought to bear. In my view, President Biden should consider the declaration of a national emergency on climate change.
Former President Trump, of course, issued an emergency declaration to divert funds toward an expensive and ineffective border wall when there was no emergency at all. Declaring one for climate change--an actual emergency--would be a giant step in the right direction, and it would allow President Biden to tap additional resources and pursue additional policies in the fight against climate change, even if Republicans in Congress remain intransigent and unable to recognize the severity of this crisis.Japan, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and scores of regional and local governments have declared states of emergency on climate change.
The United States would send a powerful signal to the world about our commitment to defeating climate change if we did so as well.
4)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 20(Extensions of Remarks - February 03, 2021)February 3, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 20 — Daily Edition.WORLD SCIENTISTS' WARNING OF A CLIMATE EMERGENCY; From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] WORLD SCIENTISTS' WARNING OF A CLIMATE EMERGENCY by HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO of oregon in the house of representatives Wednesday, February 3, 2021, By Mr. DeFAZIO.
Madam Speaker, climate change is an existential threat to all of humanity, and it is essential that we start acting--now--to stop and reverse the destructive effects of climate change. In 2020, my constituent Oregon State University Professor Dr. William Ripple, and colleagues published ``World Scientists' Warning of a Climate Emergency'' which has been endorsed by more than 11,000 scientists from 153 countries. They presented six transformative steps we can take to effectively combat climate change. I urge my colleagues to read their report and join me in acting before it is too late. [From Bioscience, Jan. 2020] World Scientists' Warning of a Climate Emergency (By William J. Ripple, Christopher Wolf, Thomas M. Newsome, Phoebe Barnard, William R. Moomaw, and 11,092 scientist signatories from 153 countries) Scientists have a moral obligation to clearly warn humanity of any catastrophic threat and `tell it like it is.' Based on this obligation and the data presented below, we herein proclaim, with more than 11,000 scientist signatories from around the world, a clear and unequivocal declaration that a climate emergency exists on planet Earth. Exactly 40 years ago, scientists from 50 nations met at the First World Climate Conference (Geneva, 1979) and agreed that alarming trends for climate change made it ``urgently necessary'' to act. Since then, similar alarms have been made through the 1992 Rio Summit, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2015 Paris Agreement, as well as scores of other global assemblies and scientists' explicit warnings of insufficient progress. Yet greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are still rising, with increasingly damaging effects on the Earth's climate. An immense change of scale in endeavors to conserve our biosphere is needed to avoid untold suffering due to the climate crisis. Despite 40 years of global climate negotiations, with few exceptions, we have generally conducted business as usual and have largely failed to address this predicament. The climate crisis has arrived and is accelerating faster than most scientists expected. It is more severe than anticipated, threatening natural ecosystems and the fate of humanity. Especially worrisome are potential climate tipping points and nature's reinforcing feedbacks that could lead to a catastrophic ``Hothouse Earth'' and cause significant disruptions to ecosystems, society, and economies, potentially making large areas of Earth uninhabitable. To secure a sustainable future, we must change how we live. Economic and population growth are among the most important drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion; thus, we need bold and drastic transformations regarding economic and population policies. We suggest six critical and interrelated steps that governments, businesses and the rest of humanity can take to lessen the worst effects of climate change. These are important steps, but are not the only actions needed or possible. 1) Energy. The world must quickly implement massive energy efficiency and conservation practices, replace fossil fuels with low carbon renewables and other cleaner sources of energy. We should leave remaining stocks of fossil fuels in the ground, and carefully pursue effective negative emissions using technology such as carbon extraction from the source and capture from the air, and by enhancing natural systems (Step 3). Wealthier countries need to support poorer nations in transitioning away from fossil fuels. We must swiftly eliminate subsidies to fossil fuel corporations and use effective and fair schemes for steadily escalating carbon prices to restrain the use of fossil fuels. 2) Short-lived pollutants. We need to promptly reduce emissions of short-lived climate pollutants, including methane, black carbon (soot), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Doing this could slow climate feedbacks and potentially reduce the short-term warming trend by >50% over the next few decades while saving millions of lives and increasing crop yields due to reduced air pollution. The 2016 Kigali amendment to phase down HFCs is welcomed. 3) Nature. We must protect and restore Earth's ecosystems. Phytoplankton, coral reefs, forests, savannas, grasslands, wetlands, peatlands, soils, mangroves, and sea grasses contribute greatly to sequestration of atmospheric CO2. Marine and terrestrial plants, animals, and microorganisms play significant roles in carbon and nutrient cycling and storage. We need to quickly curtail forest and biodiversity loss, protecting the remaining primary and intact forests, while accomplishing reforestation and afforestation where appropriate at enormous scales. Although available land may be limiting in places, up to a third of emissions reductions needed by 2030 for the Paris agreement (<2 deg.C) could be obtained with these natural climate solutions. 4) Food. Eating mostly plant-based foods while reducing the global consumption of animal products, especially ruminant livestock, can improve human health and significantly lower GHG emissions (including methane in step 2). Moreover, this will free up croplands for growing much needed human plant food instead of livestock feed, while releasing some grazing land to support natural climate solutions (step 3). Cropping practices such as minimum tillage that increase soil carbon are vitally important. We need to drastically reduce the enormous amount of food waste around the world. 5) Economy. Excessive extraction of materials and overexploitation of ecosystems, driven by economic growth, must be quickly curtailed to maintain long-term sustainability of the biosphere. We need a carbon-free economy that explicitly addresses human dependence on the biosphere and policies that guide economic decisions accordingly. Goals need to shift from GDP growth and the pursuit of affluence toward supporting ecosystem and human wellbeing by prioritizing basic needs and reducing inequality. 6) Population. Still increasing by roughly 80 million people per year or >200,000 per day, we must stabilize and ideally gradually reduce the world population within a framework that ensures social integrity. There are proven and effective policies that strengthen human rights, while lowering fertility rates and lessening the impacts of population growth on GHG emissions and biodiversity loss. These policies involve making family planning services available to all people and achieving full gender equity, including primary and secondary education as a global norm for all, especially girls and young women Mitigating and adapting to climate change while honoring the diversity of humans entails major transformations in the ways our global society functions and interacts with natural ecosystems. We are encouraged by a recent surge of concern. Governmental bodies are making climate emergency declarations. Schoolchildren are striking. Ecocide lawsuits are proceeding in the courts. Grassroots citizen movements are demanding change, and many countries, states and provinces, cities, and businesses are responding. As an Alliance of World Scientists, we stand ready to assist decision makers in a just transition to a sustainable and equitable future. The good news is that such transformative change, with social and economic justice for all, promises far greater human wellbeing in the long run than does business as usual. We believe that prospects will be greatest if decision makers and all of humanity promptly respond to this warning and declaration of a climate emergency, and act to sustain life on planet Earth, our only home.
5)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 33(Senate - February 22, 2021).February 22, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 33 — Daily Edition.SENATE RESOLUTION 68--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SUBMIT THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO THE SENATE FOR REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION;
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] SENATE RESOLUTION 68--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SUBMIT THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO THE SENATE FOR REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION by Mr. DAINES (for himself, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Barrasso, Ms. Lummis, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Moran, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Toomey) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:S. Res. 68
Whereas, in August 2016, President Obama entered the United States into the decision by the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, France, adopted December 12, 2015 (referred to in this preamble as the ``Paris Agreement''), without the advice and consent of the Senate as required by section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution of the United States; Whereas President Trump announced that the United States would cease all implementation of the Paris Agreement in June 2017, and formally withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement in November 2019, which withdrawal became effective in November 2020; Whereas, according to a report, by 2035, the Paris Agreement will result in-- (1) an aggregate gross domestic product loss of over $2,500,000,000,000; (2) a 13 to 20 percent increase in household electricity expenditures; and (3) the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs; Whereas the Paris Agreement, and cumbersome regulations associated with the Paris Agreement, put the economy of the United States at a competitive disadvantage and risk even greater job loss and energy rate increases at a time when the economy of the United States is already hurting from the COVID-19 pandemic; Whereas, in addition to the economic costs of the Paris Agreement, the Paris Agreement obligates United States taxpayer dollars towards a $100,000,000,000 fund to assist climate change mitigation and adaptation in other countries with minimal oversight or transparency; Whereas, according to a report, if every signatory of the Paris Agreement fulfills their-- (1) commitment under the Paris Agreement, the Paris Agreement will have a negligible impact on climate change, reducing global average temperatures by just 0.086 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100; or (2) commitment under the Paris Agreement if the Paris Agreement were extended another 70 years, average global temperatures would be reduced by just 0.306 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100; Whereas, through free-market innovation and investments in clean, efficient energy, the United States has seen the largest absolute decline in emissions globally while emissions from several signatories of the Paris Agreement continue to increase; Whereas clause 2 of section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution of the United States provides that the President may only enter into a treaty ``provided two thirds of the Senators present concur''; Whereas section 723.3 of chapter 11 of the Foreign Affairs Manual of the Department of State provides that, ``[i]n determining whether any international agreement should be brought into force as a treaty or as an international agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the Senate, Congress as a whole, or the President''; Whereas, given the historical precedents, the potential costs and benefits, and the fact that the Paris Agreement could in future decades result in stronger obligations for the United States than the Senate anticipated when it gave its consent to ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994, the Paris Agreement is a treaty; and Whereas, on January 20, 2021, President Biden announced his intent to reenter the United States into the Paris Agreement without seeking the advice and consent of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) the decision by the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, France, adopted December 12, 2015 (referred to in this resolution as the ``Paris Agreement''), is considered a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate; and (2) President Biden should immediately submit the Paris Agreement to the Senate.
6)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 67(Senate - April 19, 2021)April 19, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 67 — Daily Edition.STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION;From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]. STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION By Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Cardin, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Merkley, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Kaine, Mr.Markey, Mr. Booker, and Mr. Van Hollen): S. 1201. A bill to restore the United States' international leadership on climate change and clean energy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations. By Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the United States Climate Leadership on International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021--the U.S. CLIMATE Act.
The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021 provides the essential resources, programs, and support for the United States to lead the world forward in the existential fight to save our planet. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the legislation be printed in the Record following my remarks, I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.So ordered. S. 1201
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.
7)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 68(Senate - April 20, 2021).April 20, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 68 — Daily Edition.SENATE RESOLUTION 166--RECOGNIZING THE DUTY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO CREATE A GREEN NEW DEAL;
8)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 69(House of Representatives - April 21, 2021).April 21, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 69 — Daily Edition.GREEN NEW DEAL FOR AMERICA;
9)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 70(Senate - April 22, 2021).April 22, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 70 — Daily Edition.SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 8--RECOGNIZING THAT THE CLIMATE CRISIS IS DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTING THE HEALTH, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT RENEWED LEADERSHIP BY THE UNITED STATES IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS THE CLIMATE CRISIS, AND RECOGNIZING THE NEED OF THE UNITED STATES TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL, COMPREHENSIVE, AND SCIENCE-BASED CLIMATE RECOVERY PLAN TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUEL EMISSIONS, PROTECT AND ENHANCE NATURAL SEQUESTRATION, AND PUT THE UNITED STATES ON A PATH TOWARD STABILIZING THE CLIMATE SYSTEM By Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mr. Booker, Mr. Markey, Mr. Van Hollen,Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Padilla, Ms. Warren, Mrs. Murray, and Mr. Sanders) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works:;
10)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 73(Senate - April 28, 2021).April 28, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 73 — Daily Edition.LEGISLATIVE SESSION; 1st Time the US Climate Act of 2021 used in USA Congress to disapprove rules to continue using Methane Gas in USA and was applied as below described:From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office. Download A PDF Copy.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL UNDER CHAPTER 8 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, OF THE RULE SUBMITTED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY RELATING TO ``OIL AND NATURAL GAS SECTOR: EMISSION STANDARDS FOR NEW, RECONSTRUCTED, AND MODIFIED SOURCES REVIEW''-The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume legislative session.The clerk will read the title of the joint resolution for the third time.The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time s.j. res. 14 by Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. President, Leader Chuck Schumer, Chairman Tom Carper of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senator Angus King, Senator Edward Markey and I are leading supporters and sponsors of S.J. Res. 14, a joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 57,018, Sept. 14, 2020, also known as methane rescission rule. We submit these comments to provide the Senate with addit{onal information regarding the intent in adopting this resolution.
11)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 84(House of Representatives - May 14, 2021).May 14, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 84 — Daily Edition.THE CLIMATE CRISIS ISN'T JUST ABOUT WEATHER; From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] THE CLIMATE CRISIS ISN'T JUST ABOUT WEATHER (Mr. CASTEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.) By Mr. CASTEN.
Madam Speaker, wildfires, flooding, and superstorms are the most tangible signs of a warming planet, but the climate crisis is not just about weather. It is about wealth. A recent study by Swiss Re found that if we remain on our current trajectory, global GDP will fall by 18 percent by 2050. Investors understand this. They care about climate change because it is in their economic self-interest.
As BlackRock CEO Larry Fink said, ``Climate risk is investment risk.'' Main Street investors have put $37 trillion, roughly one-third of all assets under management, into climate-focused ESG investments. Unfortunately, our regulation has not kept up with that demand. There is no consistent definition of how to quantify a firm's contribution to, or protection from, a warming globe. Left to choose from a menu of methodologies, companies often just pick what is most favorable to them. We don't allow companies to pick their own financial accounting standards. Investors are asking us to provide the same consistency for their climate accounting. That is why I introduced the Climate Risk Disclosure Act, which directs the SEC to create consistent mandatory climate reporting standards for all public companies. This will allow companies to compete for capital on a level playing field, providing investors with the certainty they need to hedge their financial risk. Yesterday my bill passed committee and will now come to the floor. The right time to safeguard our financial system against climate change was decades ago, but our last chance is now.
12)CLIMATE CHANGE; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 88(House of Representatives - May 20, 2021).May 20, 2021 - Issue: Vol. 167, No. 88 — Daily Edition.REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS;From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov].REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS; Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows: By Ms. WATERS: Committee on Financial Services. H.R. 2570. A bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require certain disclosures relating to climate change, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 117-39). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.
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By Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the United States Climate Leadership on International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021--the U.S. CLIMATE Act.
provides the essential resources, programs, and support for the United States to lead the world forward in the existential fight to save our planet. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the legislation be printed in the Record following my remarks, I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum.So ordered. S. 1201
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION By Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Cardin, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Merkley, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Kaine, Mr.Markey, Mr. Booker, and Mr. Van Hollen): S. 1201. A bill to restore the United States' international leadership on climate change and clean energy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations. By Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the United States Climate Leadership on International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021--the U.S. CLIMATE Act. Mr. President, climate change represents a clear and present threat to the stability, security and prosperity of nations around the world, including the United States. The cost of climate-induced disasters becomes more indisputable and devastating with every passing year. Barring swift and ambitious action, the situation will only worsen. We've all seen the devastating impacts of climate change.
For years, unprecedented tropical storms have destroyed communities in Mozambique, Central America, and the United States, including communities in my home state of New Jersey. This past February, incredibly abnormal and brutal winter weather, exacerbated by climatic disruption to the Arctic's polar vortex, killed eleven people and left thousands in Texas without power and water. Less than a year prior, deadly wildfires, exacerbated by climate change engulfed California, killing 31 people, and Australia, killing 34 people, and forced thousands to flee their homes and lose their livelihoods. And yet, while hurricanes and storm surges are horrific, climate change is also increasing the intensity, length and geographic expanse of droughts around the world contributing to food insecurity, natural resource scarcity and desertification.
Likewise, intensifying effects of climate change pose an existential threat to hundreds of millions of people and exacerbate global forced migration. Nations like Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia are incredibly vulnerable to mass displacement due to rising sea levels. Island nations like Tuvalu, Seychelles, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Kiribati are already managing internal migration due to climate change induced sea-level rise. Without ambitious action to both keep global leverage temperatures well below an increase of two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels it is forecasted that the entirety of certain nations may become uninhabitable within my grandchildren's lifetime. It is a moral imperative for the Senators in this body, and humanity, to act to ensure that is not the world we leave for the generations that will come after us.
Today's generations are the first people to personally and regularly experience the effects of climate change on the natural world and its impact on humanity . . . and we are also the last generations that can, and must, act to prevent the worst forecasts from becoming reality. Changing climate and weather patterns intensification of global food insecurity and resource scarcity especially threaten the lives and security of the world's most vulnerable populations. For months, heavy rainfall and warmer temperatures have triggered a locust plague in East Africa that has lasted more than an entire year.
This historic locust plague--triggered by conditions exacerbated by climate change--has threatened agricultural and pastoral livelihoods and worsened already acute food insecurity in the region. At the same time, similar extreme weather patterns are expected to expand and shift the ranges of life- threatening diseases like malaria, West Nile Virus, cholera, and others. Beyond the palpable destruction and devastation of climate- induced crises, climate change is a ``threat multiplier,'' a term coined by the CNA Corporation's Military Advisory Board in 2007 to express the way in which climate change exacerbates instability; conflict and subsequent displacement; terrorism; and other vital security matters.
Clearly, climate change does not begin nor end at any nation's borders. No one is immune to the effects of climate change--which is why we must not only work with the rest of the [[Page S2014]] world to combat this crisis, but lead the charge. It is simply not enough to enact robust domestic policies--this is a global problem that requires internationally collaborative solutions. What's more, our leadership and renewed international engagement can generate opportunities for Americans. By committing to international agreements and adhering to emerging international production norms, we are opening the global markets for the innovation, ingenuity, and leadership of the American private sector. I commend the Biden administration's commitment to returning the United States to the global stage, thereby granting us the capacity to reengage and lead the international community in tackling the greatest threat of our time.
President Biden's Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad has designated climate action as a core tenant of U.S. diplomacy and national security planning. He has appointed former Secretary of State John Kerry as Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, ensuring that climate considerations have a strong advocate where important decisions are being made. And, under the leadership of President Biden, the United States has officially rejoined the Paris Agreement.
The time for debate and discussion on why and how we must tackle this crisis is over. The science is clear: we must achieve net zero emissions by 2050 in order to ensure a safe and prosperous future for ourselves and our posterity. Now is the time for action and implementation of crucial efforts to save our planet. Congress can and must do more to support the restoration of the United States' climate diplomacy and leadership.
That is why I am introducing the United States Climate Leadership in International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technological Enhancement Act, or the U.S. CLIMATE Act, of 2021, a comprehensive piece of legislation to bolster President Biden's bold commitment to U.S. climate leadership by providing resources, programs and policy to support and expedite the realization of United States action that will be essential to regaining the international community's trust and partnership with the U.S. in the global climate fight. It represents a bold course of action that Congress should take to support forward-looking leadership in the White House in their commitment to preventing the worst-case scenarios of climate change from becoming reality.
Title I of the bill establishes climate change as a cross-cutting imperative at the State Department. It also calls for the integration of climate models and forecasting into national security planning across all federal agencies and features directives on protecting our security and environmental interests in the Arctic.
Title II declares support for U.S. cooperation and engagement in international agreements.
This includes directives on re-entry into the Paris Agreements; ratification of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocols; compliance with environmental initiatives of the International Civil Aviation Organization; and the establishment of new international efforts to mitigate transportation sector and greenhouse gas emissions.
Title III integrates climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts into a range of tools and initiatives at USAID, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State, the DFC, and the United Nations.
Title IV incorporates a clean energy mandate into the United States' diplomatic and development efforts, thereby protecting our own energy security interests and promoting responsible global energy production.
Title V of the bill addresses the United States' bilateral and multilateral engagement on climate change, encouraging U.S. cooperation with China, India, the European Union and other key partners.
Title VI of the U.S. CLIMATE Act integrates our colleague from Hawai'i, Senator Hirono's Women and Climate Change Act, which acknowledges and addresses the disproportionate effects of climate change on women and girls around the world.
The science is clear: we are running out of time to stave off the most devastating effects of climate change that will directly impact our children and our children's children. After four years of being absent from the conversation, it is time for the United States to not only return to the table, but lead the charge to protect our shared home. We cannot solve this crisis alone--this is not an American problem, this is a global crisis that can only be combatted with coordinated, international action.
The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021 provides the essential resources, programs, and support for the United States to lead the world forward in the existential fight to save our planet. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the legislation be printed in the Record following my remarks, I yield the floor and note the absence of a quorum. So ordered. S. 1201
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1.
SHORT TITLE;
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--
This Act may be cited as the ``United States Climate Leadership in International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021''.
(b) Table of Contents.--
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Purpose.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
TITLE I--
CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Sec. 101. Climate diplomacy.
Sec. 102. Enhancing United States security considerations for global climate disruptions.
Sec. 103. Arctic diplomacy.
TITLE II--
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress in support of the United States returning to the Paris Agreement.
Sec. 202. Enhanced United States commitment to the Paris Agreement.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress regarding ratification of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
Sec. 204. Compliance with the carbon offset and reduction scheme for international aviation.
Sec. 205. Short-lived climate pollutants.
Sec. 206. International cooperation regarding clean transportation and sustainable land use and community development.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States reengagement with the Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty on climate action.
TITLE III--
CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT
Sec. 301. International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program.
Sec. 302. United States contributions to the Green Climate Fund.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on United States engagements at the World Economic Forum.
Sec. 304. Clean energy and the United States International Development Finance Corporation.
Sec. 305. Consistency in United States policy on development finance and climate change.
TITLE IV--
CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Sec. 401. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.
Sec. 402. Department of State primacy for energy diplomacy.
Sec. 403. Reports on United States participation in Mission Innovation and the Clean Energy Ministerial.
Sec. 404. Reduced deforestation.
TITLE V--
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND COOPERATION
Sec. 501. North American Strategy.
Sec. 502. Accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 503. United States and European Union cooperation on climate finance for developing countries.
Sec. 504. Sense of Congress on clean energy cooperation with India.
Sec. 505. Power Africa.
Sec. 506. Caribbean Energy Initiative.
Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on conservation of the Amazon River basin.
Sec. 508. Sense of Congress regarding renewable energy in Indonesia.
TITLE VI--WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACT
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Findings.
Sec. 603. Definitions.
Sec. 604. Statement of policy.
Sec. 605. Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate Change.
Sec. 606. Development and implementation of strategy and policies to prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on women globally.
Sec. 607. Climate Change within the Office of Global Women's Issues.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--
Congress finds the following: [[Page S2015]]
(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first published by the United States Global Change Research Program in 2018, concluded that--
(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the degradation of natural resources that absorb atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the dominant causes of climate change during the past century;
(B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
(i) causing sea levels to rise;
(ii) increasing the global average temperature of the Earth;
(iii) increasing the incidence and severity of wildfires;and
(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other disasters that threaten human life, healthy communities, and critical infrastructure.
(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would cause--
(A)
(i) the displacement, and the forced internal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is taken (according to the World Bank); and
(ii) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every year (according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating effects of climate change;
(B)
(i) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual economic output in the United States (a 10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the Fourth National Climate Assessment); and
(ii) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World Bank);
(C)
(i) greater food insecurity and decreased agricultural production due to climate change's effects on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events; and
(ii) the proliferation of agricultural pests and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading ecosystems, and water scarcity (according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization); and
(D) more than 350,000,000 additional people worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
(3) According to the International Monetary Fund, a persistent annual increase in average global temperature of .04 degrees Celsius would reduce global real gross domestic product per capita by 7.22 percent by 2100.
(4) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, climate change is exacerbating unusual regional weather conditions, which is driving the current and prolonged desert locust outbreak that is threatening food security across East Africa and Southeast Asia.
(5) According to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services--
(A) an increase in the global average temperature of between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius will result in a significant reduction in the worldwide number of land species;
(B) an increase in the global average temperature of 2 degrees Celsius--
(i) will place 5 percent of world's species at risk of extinction; and
(ii) will result in the destruction of more than 99 percent of all coral reefs worldwide; and
(C) an increase in the global average temperature of 4.3 degrees Celsius will place 16 percent of world's terrestrial species at risk of extinction.
(6) According to the International Energy Agency, the United States, China, India, and the European Union (including the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.
(7) China, which is the world's top greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the United States' core interest in climate stability--
(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to ``peak'' emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;
(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, a pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060; and
(C) has yet to announce an updated nationally determined contribution.
(8) On October 26, 2020, Japan, the world's third largest economy and fifth greatest carbon emitter, announced a pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.
Despite apprehension about growing nuclear energy sources, Japan aims to increase its share of renewable and nuclear energy following new targets unveiled next year.
(9) India has met its growing energy demands by becoming a global leader in renewable energy generation. Despite significant investments in renewable energy, and the implementation of strong national greenhouse gas mitigation policies, India continues to operate some of the world's dirtiest fossil fuel power plants and has high emissions generated from its transportation sector. India is a critical market for foreign investment and will be a major competitor in international clean energy development futures.
(10) India's leadership within the Clean Energy Ministerial, the Mission Innovation initiative, and the International Solar Alliance has put India at the forefront of renewable energy development and helped India achieve a top 5 global rank among clean energy producers. Installed electricity capacity from renewables in India grew by 144 percent between 2014 and 2020. Approximately $42,000,000,000 was invested into India's renewable energy sector between 2014 and 2019.
(11) The European Union demonstrated its strong commitment to climate action by making the ambitious pledge to reduce the collective greenhouse gas emissions of its 27 member nations by at least 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The European Parliament went even further, voting to reduce its collective economy wide greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels). These commitments represent substantial improvements from the previous goal of a 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.
(12) The European Union's member nations have also provided the equivalent of approximately $120,000,000,000 between 2014 and 2020 in support and financing to build climate change resilience and develop low carbon energy capacity throughout the developing world.
(13) The European Union has traditionally been a steadfast partner with United States in the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change by pushing for improvedaccountability, transparency, and shared responsibility among parties in mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions. As the United State Government's executive branch has pulled away from climate action commitments, the European Union has increased its cooperation with coalitions of States through partnerships such as the United States Climate Alliance.
(14) Among the world's top greenhouse gas emitters, the United States is the only country that--
(A) has rescinded national policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) has advanced policies aimed at bolstering fossil fuel consumption and extraction, including through the removal of Federal protections of public lands that are critical wilderness areas vital to maintaining healthy natural ecosystems; and
(C) has abstained or withdrawn itself from several global cooperative efforts acknowledging and addressing the climate crisis.
(15) United States leadership during deliberations over the Paris Agreement--
(A) was exemplified by--
(i) its commitment to reduce national emissions by 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels;
(ii) its leadership in the ``Umbrella Group'' and its role as cofounder of the ``High Ambition Coalition'';
(iii) its co-facilitation of the UNFCCC;
(iv) its work with the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement on agenda item 5: Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action; and
(v) its support for the enhanced transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement;
(vi) its pledge of $3,000,000,000 to the Green Climate Fund (of which the United States still owed $2,000,000,000) in support of developing countries' efforts to adapt to climate change and to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; and
(vii) the development of critical bilateral climate action cooperation initiatives with China and India; and
(B) established the United States as essential to uniting the world in climate action cooperation.
(16) The United States' reversal on nearly all climate action policies since 2017, including repealing the Clean Power Plan (announced by President Obama in August 2015), cancelling contributions to the United Nation's Green Climate Fund, abstaining from all G7 and G20 climate action communiques, and withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement--
(A) undermines the viability of the Paris Agreement;
(B) harms American diplomacy;
(C) disadvantages the ability of the United State private sector to compete in a clean energy global economy, for which the International Finance Corporation estimates that investments spurred by the Paris Agreement will creates up to $23,000,000,000,000 in new investment opportunities;
(D) erodes the United States' leadership, standing, and trust within the international community; and
(E) concedes leadership and economic opportunity to foreign governments keen on taking advantage of the United States' absence from international climate action initiatives.
(17) The Paris Agreement's central aim is--
(A) to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by maintaining the global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; and
(B) to pursue efforts to further limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
(18) The Paris Agreement--
(A) specifies the need for a strong global response to climate change;
(B) acknowledges that all ``[p]arties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous [[Page S2016]] peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity'';
(C) notes the importance of ``climate justice'' when mitigating and adapting to climate change;
(D) recognizes ``the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change'';
(E) requires all parties to put forward their best efforts through nationally determined contributions and to strengthen these efforts in the future;
(F) requires each party to update its nationally determined contribution every 5 years, with each successive nationally determined contribution representing a progression beyond the previous nationally determined contribution, and reflecting the party's highest possible ambition;
(G) recognizes that marine ecosystems covering more than 70 percent of the Earth's surface have an integral role in climate balance; and
(H) was developed under the UNFCCC, an international environmental treaty which the United States ratified, with the advice and consent of the Senate on October 15, 1992.
(19) Seventy percent of the Paris Agreement signatories' nationally determined contributions in support of the goals of the Paris Agreement are ocean-inclusive, and 39 Paris Agreement signatories are focused on the inclusion of ocean action in nationally determined contributions through the Because the Ocean initiative.
(20) The United States communicated its nationally determined contribution--
(A) to achieve, by 2025, an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 percent below its 2005 level; and
(B) to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28 percent.
(21) A thriving clean energy industry in the United States, which employs more than 500,000 Americans, is essential in achieving these targets.
(22) A number of existing laws and regulations in the United States also are relevant to achieving this target, including--
(A) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.);
(B) the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-486); and
(C) the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007(Public Law 110-140).
(23) On November 4, 2020, the United States withdrawal from the Paris Agreement became effective, which at the time resulted in the United States being the only state party (out of 197 parties) to the UNFCCC that is not a party to the Paris Agreement.
(24) On January 20, 2021, President Biden initiated the process for reentering the United States into the Paris Agreement.
On February 19, 2021, the United States officially rejoined the Paris Agreement.
(25) Article 8 of the Paris Agreement states, ``Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.'' Such adverse effects include strong winds from hurricanes and tropical storms, and flooding from storm surges and heavy rain, that inflict losses on various sectors of the United States economy.
(26) The Paris Agreement requires that parties ``should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework'', which includes measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels.
(27) The Paris Agreement is an example of the multilateral, international cooperation needed to overcome climate change- related challenges facing the global community, such as reducing emissions, promoting economic growth, and deploying clean energy technologies.
(28) The Paris Agreement recognizes ``the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change.''.
(29) The Paris Agreement recognizes that--
(A) adaptation is a global challenge facing all countries, with local, subnational, national, regional, and international dimensions; and
(B) adapting to the effects of climate change is a key component of the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods, and ecosystems.
(30) American leadership during the Paris Agreement negotiations encouraged widespread international participation in the Paris Agreement.
(31) American States, cities, and businesses are stepping up and pledging to meet the Paris Agreement goals in the wake of absent and uncertain leadership by the President.
(32) The Paris Agreement--
(A) has driven innovation in developing cleaner, more reliable, and more affordable forms of energy;
(B) has demonstrated that addressing climate change and providing affordable energy to American consumers are not mutually exclusive; and
(C) has encouraged the United States to develop the Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization, which--
(i) was released on November 16, 2016; and
(ii) states, ``Energy efficiency improvements enable the energy system to provide the services we need with fewer resources and emissions. Over the past several years, the United States has demonstrated that programs and standards to improve the energy efficiency of buildings, appliances and vehicles can cost-effectively cut carbon pollution and lower energy bills, while maintaining significant support from U.S. industry and consumers.''.
(33) Global temperatures must be kept below 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrialized levels to avoid the most severe impacts of a changing climate, which will require--
(A) global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from human sources of 40 to 60 percent from 2010 levels by 2030; and
(B) net-zero global emissions by 2050;
(b) Sense of Congress.--
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) when the United States proffers a strong commitment and focused leadership on climate action, the rest of the world will likely follow its example;
(2) when the United States abdicates leadership on such matters, other countries are likely to waiver on their commitments to action and retract to insular posturing on matters that require cooperation; and
(3) in order to avert the worst impacts of climate change, which is in the core national interest of the United States, the United States should--
(A) prioritize climate change in its foreign policy, and ensure that climate change is taken into account in all foreign policy decision making;
(B) set the standard for ambition on climate action;
(C) use its diplomatic leverage to create incentives for other countries to take strong action on climate change;
(D) broker, with other world powers, bilateral commitments on emissions reductions and climate finance and support for developing countries, which are critical for--
(i) building trust and consensus around global cooperation on climate action; and
(ii) sending important investment signals to private finance and private industry on investment and development trends;
(E) be transparent in how the United States is delivering on its commitments;
(F) ensure it is adopting and implementing consistent policies and practices with respect to climate change across bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions;
(G) hold other world powers accountable for making and meeting strong commitments;
(H) call for reciprocal standards of transparency; and
(I) support developing countries, in an inclusive manner--
(i) to expand deployment and access to clean energy;
(ii) to plan and invest in climate change adaptation solutions;
(iii) to improve climate change resilience capacities; and
(iv) to promote--
(I) sustainable agriculture practices;
(II) food security; and
(III) natural resource conservation.
SEC. 3. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to provide authorities, resources, policies, and recommended administrative actions--
(1) to restore United States global leadership on addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United States foreign policy;
(2) to improve the United States' commitment to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas emission and improve developing countries' resilience and adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
(3) to reclaim, accept, and fully engage diplomacy within a variety of current and outstanding multilateral institutions that the United States has withdrawn, withheld support, or diminished meaningful engagement from in recent years;
(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation and deployment and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate change adaptation capacities;
(5) to ensure that the United States' national security apparatus integrates critically important data on the compounding effects that climate change is having on global security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where, and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other drivers of insecurity; and
(6) to authorize funding and programs to support a reaffirmation of the United States' commitments to international cooperation and support for developing and vulnerable countries to take climate action.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--
The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; [[Page S2017]]
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Clean energy.--
The term ``clean energy'' means--
(A) renewable energy and energy from systems;
(B) energy production processes that emit zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;
(C) systems and processes that capture and permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel production and electricity generation units;
(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency and electricity generated from electrical generation units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power production resources, or less feedstocks; and
(E) zero emission vehicles.
(3) Climate action.--
The term ``climate action'' means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate- induced impacts, including--
(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
(B) integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning; and
(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and human and institutional capacity with respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warning.
(4) Climate crisis.--
The term ``climate crisis'' means the social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric carbon.
(5) Climate diplomacy.--
The term ``climate diplomacy'' means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation and other measures short of war or violence around issues related to addressing global climate change, including--
(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific data and information on the cause and effects of climate change;
(C) the security, social, economic, and political instability risks associated with the effects of climate change;
(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters that are related to or associated with climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;
(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to the effects of change;
(F) sustainable land use and natural resource conservation;
(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to the effects of climate change;
(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to low or zero carbon economies and accounting for laborers within affected economies; and
(I) technological innovations that reduce or eliminate carbon emissions.
(6) Climate security.--
The term ``climate security'' means the effects of climate change on--
(A) United States national security concerns and subnational, national, and regional political stability; and
(B) overseas security and conflict situations that are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental factors and events, including--
(i) the intensification and frequency of droughts, floods,wildfires, tropical storms, and other extreme weather events;
(ii) changes in historical severe weather, drought, and wildfire patterns;
(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions that had not regularly experienced such phenomena;
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the expansion of geographical ranges affected by drought; and
(v) changes in marine environments that effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the Beaufort Sea.
(7) Nationally determined contribution.--
The term ``nationally determined contribution'' means a country's pledged efforts to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change, which may include a financial pledge of support or financing to assist developing countries achieve their climate action goals, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, which requires each Party--
(A) to ``prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve''; and
(B) to ``pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions''.
(8) Natural climate solutions.--
The term ``natural climate solutions'' mean actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems that--
(A) address climate change effectively and adaptively; and
(B) simultaneously provide human well-being and environmental benefits.
(9) Natural resources.--
The term ``natural resources'' means the terrestrial, freshwater, estuarine, and marine fish, wildlife, plants, land, air, water, habitats, and ecosystems.
(10) Net zero greenhouse gas emissions.--
The term ``net zero greenhouse gas emissions'' means that any anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are balanced or offset by deliberate activities that absorb or capture and permanently store equivalent amounts of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
(11) Paris agreement.--
The term ``Paris Agreement'' means the international agreement adopted by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's 21st Conference of Parties in Paris, France on December 12, 2015.
(12) Renewable energy.--
The term ``renewable energy'' means all forms of energy produced from sources that naturally occur or are replenished in nature in a sustainable manner, including bioenergy, geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean energy, solar energy, and wind energy.
(13) Resilience.--
The term ``resilience'' means the ability of human made and natural systems (including their component parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions.
(14) UNFCCC.--
The term ``UNFCCC'' means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York May9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(15) United states-mexico-canada agreement; usmca.--
The terms ``United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement'' and ``USMCA'' mean the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, done at Buenos Aires November 30, 2018.
TITLE I--
CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SEC. 101.
CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.
(a) In General.--
The President and the Secretary of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States foreign policy by--
(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address the climate crisis; and
(2) improving coordination and integration of climate action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
(b) Climate Action Integration.--
The Secretary of State, through the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and any other designees, shall--
(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative across the Department of State;
(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
(A) to assess how issues related to climate change and United States climate action are integrated into their operations and programs;
(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and
(C) to make available the technical assistance and resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant expertise to provide technical assistance and expert support to other bureaus within the Department of State regarding climate action, clean energy development, and climate diplomacy;
(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the Department of State's decision making processes;
(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide appropriate technical support and resources--
(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and their respective designees charged with addressing climate change and associated issues;
(B) to United States diplomats advancing United States foreign policy related to climate action; and
(C) for the appropriate engagement and integration of relevant domestic agencies in international climate change affairs, including United States participation in multilateral fora; and
(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global climate security.
(c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.--
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all foreign missions are--
(1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy; [[Page S2018]]
(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
(d) Report.--
Not later than 200 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of State; and
(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate action and climate diplomacy.
(e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--
If the positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate.
(f) Climate Change Experts in Key Embassies.--
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that--
(1) identifies the number of personnel of the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development who--
(A) dedicate a significant portion of their work to climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, food security, or clean energy matters; and
(B) are stationed at United States missions in countries that are highly vulnerable to the effects or major greenhouse gas emitters;
(2) analyzes the need for Federal climate change policy specialist personnel in United States embassies, United States Agency for International Development missions, and other United States diplomatic and international development missions; and
(3) includes--
(A) recommendations for increasing climate change expertise within United States missions abroad among foreign service officers; and
(B) options for assigning to such missions climate change attaches from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, or other relevant Federal agencies.
(g) Climate Change Advisors.--
The Secretary of State, or the Secretary's designee, shall have primary responsibility for the management and execution of United States climate diplomacy and related foreign policy and shall make appropriate arrangements with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other relevant Federal agencies and departments to assign personnel from such agencies and departments to serve as dedicated advisors on climate change matters in embassies of the United States or in other United States diplomatic or international development missions.
(h) Climate Change Support and Financing.--
The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and other relevant departments and agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of the Treasury, the United States Trade and Development Agency, and the United States International Development Finance Corporation, of contributing development finance or foreign assistance relevant to United States international climate action and in support of United States climate diplomacy.
(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
SEC. 102.
ENHANCING UNITED STATES SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.
(a) In General.--
The Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant agencies, shall conduct biennil comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate system, including--
(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural disasters;
(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including fresh water;
(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
(4) conditions that contribute to--
(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
(B) foreign political and economic instability;
(C) international migration of vulnerable and underserved populations;
(D) the failure of national governments; and
(E) gender-based violence; and
(5) United States and allied military readiness, operations, and strategy.
(b) Purposes.--
The purposes of the evaluations conducted under subsection (a) are--
(1) to support the practical application of scientific data and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and stability despite growing global environmental risks and changes;
(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission execution of United States international development and diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of climate change;
(3) to improve coordination between United States science agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change and United States national security agencies;
(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous communities, and other historically marginalized populations; and
(5) to inform the development of the climate security strategy described in subsection (d).
(c) Scope.--
The evaluations conducted under subsection (a)
shall--
(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks associated with global, regional, and localized effects of climate change; and
(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with effects, including--
(A) sea level rise;
(B) freshwater resource scarcity;
(C) wildfires; and
(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather conditions and events, such as flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical cyclones.
(d) Climate Security Strategy.--
The Secretary shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)--
(1) to inform the development and implementation of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other offices and programs operating chief of mission authority, including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, prevention, and assistance; and
(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and actions--
(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food production, fresh water and other critical natural resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized groups, and economic activity;
(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense assets abroad.;
(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign policy and security decision-making processes, including awarding foreign assistance;
(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions and countries that are--
(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(ii) strategically significant to the United States;
(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign countries to the effects of climate change as a means of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
(F) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations that are least capable of coping with the effects of climate change--
(i) to conduct climate security evaluations; and
(ii) to facilitate the development of climate security action plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets abroad;
(H) to build international institutional capacity to address climate security implications and to advance United States interests, regional stability, and global security; and
(I) other activities that advance -
(i) the utilization and integration of climate science in national security planning; and
(ii) the clear understanding of how the effects of climate change can exacerbate security risks and threats.
SEC. 103.
ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
(A) creates new national and regional security challenges due to increased military activity in the Arctic;
(B) heightens the risks of potential conflicts spilling over into the Arctic region from interventions and theaters of tension in other regions of the world;
(C) threatens maritime safety due to inadequate regional resource capacity to patrol the increase in vessel traffic this remote region is experiencing from the growing expanses of open Arctic water from diminished annual levels of sea ice; [[Page S2019]]
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile and historically pristine environment and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences outlined in paragraph
(1) b--
(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and extremely dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in the Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations for mitigating and responding to threats and risks in the Arctic;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on time scales necessary for ensuring regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
(D) investing in resources, including a significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all nations in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for
--(i) maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region; and
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety initiatives in the Arctic region.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Arctic nations.
--The term ``Arctic Nations'' means the 8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic region.
--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.
(c) Designation.
--The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as ``Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs'', who shall be responsible for affairs in the Arctic Region.
(d) Duties.
-- The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs shall
--(1) facilitate the development and coordination of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to
--(A) meeting national security needs;
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources;
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural resource management and economic development;
(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the Arctic Nations;
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that affect them; and
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues;
(2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives, and, as appropriate, represent the United States within multilateral fora that address international cooperation and foreign policy matters in the Arctic Region;
(3) help inform transnational commerce and commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;
(4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the current and projected effects of climate change on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
(5) make available the methods and approaches on the integration of climate science to other regional security planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure that broader decision making processes may more adequately account for the effects of climate change;
(6) serve as a key point of contact for other Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community, on Arctic Region security issues;
(7) develop and facilitate the implementation of an Arctic Region Security Policy in accordance with subsection (f);
(8) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to encourage other countries and international multilateral organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and
(9) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs and the Secretary of State shall prescribe.
(e) Rank and Status
.--The Secretary of State may change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs designated under subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador if
--(1) the President nominates the person so designated to that rank and status; and
(2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and status.
(f) Arctic Region Security Policy
.--The Arctic Region Security Policy shall include requirements for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, regional bureaus, and other offices with a role in conflict avoidance, prevention and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, prevention, and assistance to assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and actions
--(1) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic Nations to the effects of climate change and increased civilian and military activity from Arctic Nations and other nations that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region due to decreased sea ice, warmer ambient air temperatures and other effects of climate change, as a means of reducing the risk of conflict and instability;
(2) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic Nations that
--(A) are vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United States;
(3) to account for the impacts on human health, safety, stresses, reliability, food production, fresh water and other critical natural resources, and economic activity;
(4) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision making process on foreign assistance awards to Arctic Nations;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating with Arctic Nations on collaborative approaches
--(A) to sustainably manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic Nations on the management of maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the transit policies for access to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic Nations; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion; and
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.
TITLE II
--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS
SEC. 201.
SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES RETURNING TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
It is the sense of Congress that
--(1) President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement was a mistake that harmed the leadership, economic, national security, and diplomatic interests of the United States; and
(2) the United States' expeditious return to the Paris Agreement is a critical first step to restoring United States leadership among, and in cooperation with, the international community;
(3) resuming United States' global leadership in the Paris Agreement's implementation process is critical to ensuring that the rules and procedures for implementing the Paris Agreement achieve maximum benefits for the United States;
(4) prioritizing the immediate preparation and communication of an updated United States' nationally determined contribution in support of the Paris Agreement will demonstrate a renewed and increasingly ambitious United States' commitment to climate action, which should incorporate
--(A) strategies for achieving domestic greenhouse gas emissions reductions that achieve the United States' 2015 national determined contribution to the Paris Agreement;
(B) an ambitious 2030 mitigation target representing a mid-term goal that signifies the emission reductions trajectory the United States needs to be on to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(C) commitments to engage constructively with parties to the Paris Agreement regarding the development of strategies to secure ambitious commitments from all parties and to ensure adequate progress on mitigating greenhouses sufficiently to prevent 1.5 degree Celsius increase of warming;
(D) announced intentions of the United States' to accept and fulfill United States obligations to other international agreements to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, including the International Civil Aviation Organization's Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation and the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol;
(E) an intention to resume the United States' cooperation and support for cooperative climate action detailed and announced in various climate change communiques produced by the G7, the G20, the Arctic Council, the United Nations, and others for which the United States has recently abstained;
(F) a platform and policy incentives for the United States private sector, and State and local governments to accurately account for their contributions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
(G) a new, increased contribution pledge to the Green Climate Fund, and contributions to other complementary multilateral funds;
(H) a commitment to resume a leadership role within the Green Climate Fund to achieve accountability, transparency, and management reforms; and [[Page S2020]]
(I) other activities that advance United States climate-related foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global climate security;
(5) United States collaboration with other nations, especially developing countries most impacted by the need to transition carbon intensive industrial sectors, and the workforces of these affected industries, on the global transition to environmentally sustainable economies and societies to ensure workers benefit from opportunities that arise in a transition to economies powered by clean energy, including engagements on
--(A) realizing the potential to create significant net gains in employment opportunities through increases in the number of decent jobs through investments in environmentally sustainable production and consumption and management of natural resources;
(B) improving the quality of jobs and increased incomes on a large scale from more productive processes, and environmentally sustainable products and services in sectors such as agriculture, renewable energy, transport, construction, recycling, and tourism;
(C) social inclusion through improved access to affordable, environmentally sustainable energy and payments for environmental services, which are of particular relevance to women and residents in rural areas who face more economic challenges;
(D) protections from the effects of economic restructuring that would otherwise result in the displacement of workers and possible job losses;
(E) training and access to new job opportunities attributable to new environmentally sustainable and clean energy powered enterprises and workplaces;
(F) attracting new environmentally sustainable and clean energy powered enterprises and workplaces to communities transitioning to low carbon economies and assist with adapting to climate change to avoid loss of assets and livelihoods and involuntary migration; and
(G) avoiding adverse effects on the incomes of poor households from higher energy and commodity prices; and
(6) the United States should communicate its intention to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
SEC. 202.
ENHANCED UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
(a) Sense of Congress Regarding Need for Updated United States Nationally Determined Contribution.
--It is the sense of Congress that
--(1) all parties determine their voluntary contributions to the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement;
(2) the development and submission of a new United States' nationally determined contribution should be prioritized, in accordance with Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement;
(3) the new United States' nationally determined contribution should
--(A) represent an ambitious 2030 target, in accordance with Articles 4.2 and 4.3 of the Paris Agreement; and
(B) put the United States on an appropriate trajectory towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;and
(4) the plan required under subsection (b) should
--(A) be developed in accordance with Article 4.13 of the Paris Agreement;
(B) inform United States' obligations under Article 13.7 of the Paris Agreement; and
(C) clearly demonstrate how the United States will achieve the target referred to in paragraph (3).
(b) Plan for Developing the United States' Nationally Determined Contribution.
--At least 20 days before the United States submits a new or provisional nationally determined contribution, the President shall consult with, and provide embargoed drafts of the nationally determined contribution to, the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Public Transparency.
--The President shall make available to the public a plan for the United States to meet its nationally determined contribution, which shall include
--(1) ambitious, economy-wide, short-term greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets for 2025 and 2030, with relevant addenda to the plan following its initial submission;
(2) considerations made for populations, regions, industries, and constituencies that could be affected by actions to meet the targets described in paragraph (1) and the failure to meet such targets, including the effect of such actions on
--(A) United States' jobs, wages, and pay;
(B) the cost of energy (such as electricity and gasoline) for consumers; and
(C) the ability to develop and deploy new, innovative, domestically produced technologies;
(3) a description of how the United States may use
--(A) multilateral and bilateral diplomatic tools, in addition to the expert committee established under Article 15 of the Paris Agreement, to encourage and assist other parties to the Paris Agreement to fulfill their announced contributions; and
(B) the mechanisms under Articles 12 and 13 of the Paris Agreement to urge enhanced actions from other parties to achieve the overall objectives of the Paris Agreement;
(4) a description of how the Paris Agreement's loss and damage provisions would affect infrastructure resiliency in the United States;
(5) a coherent and stable policy framework for sustainable enterprise development and decent work opportunities for all United States residents that
--(A) is developed through engagement in social dialogue, particularly in
--(i) communities that have historically experienced environmental injustice; and
(ii) communities with economies that are heavily dependent on fossil fuel production or consumption; and
(B) maintains such social dialogue, in line with international labor standards
-- (i) at all stages, from policy design to implementation and evaluation; and
(ii) at all levels, from the national level to the enterprise; and
(6) an accounting of other relevant activities that advance United States foreign policy objectives of
--(A) advancing global greenhouse gas mitigation;
(B) supporting climate change adaptation activities; and
(C) improving global climate security.
(d) Education and Public Awareness.
--(1) In general.
--The plan developed under subsection (c) shall be consistent with Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, which states ``Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.''.
(2) Rule of construction.
--Nothing in this Act may be construed to require or prohibit the President from including in the plan developed under subsection (b), consistent with the prohibition described in section 438 of the General Education Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232a), recommendations to support State and local educational agencies, in integrating instruction on human-caused climate change and the societal, environmental, and economic effects of such climate change into curricula taught in elementary and secondary schools under the control of such State and local educational agencies, in order to meet the goals and ambitions of the Paris Agreement to ensure climate education and awareness in schools.
(e) Sense of Congress Regarding the Accountability of Parties to the Paris Agreement.
--It is the sense of Congress that the United States shall use its diplomatic leverage and the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement that promote transparency, reporting, and accountability among parties to seek to play critical leadership roles on the Paris Agreement's critical working groups, subsidiary bodies, and constituted bodies
--(1) to maximize the United States' ability to hold other parties accountable for meeting the commitments to the Paris Agreement; and
(2) to ensure that all parties commit to and meet ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets.
SEC. 203.
SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RATIFICATION OF THE KIGALI AMENDMENT TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL.
(a) Findings.--
Congress finds the following:
(1) The chemical refrigerant alternative, hydrofluorocarbon (HFC), and its chemical derivatives identified in Annex F of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal September 16, 1987, which replaced hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), are short-lived and highly potent greenhouse gases.
(2) Some HFCs are 4,000 times more potent greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide.
The expansion of mass production and worldwide use of HFCs have significantly contributed to the recent worsening of the global climate crisis.
(3) In October 15, 2016, the parties at the 28th Meeting of Parties to the Montreal Protocol, with the support of the United States, adopted an amendment (referred to in the Act as the ``Kigali Amendment'') to the Montreal Protocol to globally phase down the production and application of hydrofluorocarbons, most commonly used as refrigerants in air conditioners and for cold storage.
(4) The Kigali Amendment calls for parties to cut the production and consumption of HFCs by more than 80 percent during a 30-year period--
(A) to eliminate an estimated 80,000,000,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by 2050; and
(B) to avoid up to 0.5 degree Celsius warming by the end of the century, while continuing to protect the ozone layer.
(5) United States' ratification of the Kigali Amendment will require the advice and consent of the Senate. There is broad bipartisan support for the Kigali Amendment in the Senate, as evidenced by a letter sent by 13 Republican senators to the President on June 4, 2018, urging the President to submit the Kigali Amendment to the Senate for advice and consent.
(6) The Environmental Protection Agency received sufficient domestic legal authority to comply with the international obligations of the Kigali Amendment under title II of the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2021 (division G of Public Law 116-260), which was enacted on December 27, 2020.
(7) As of the date of the introduction of the Act, the President has not submitted the Kigali Amendment to the Senate for advice [[Page S2021]] and consent and the United States Government has neither ratified nor implemented policies to comply with the Kigali Amendment.
(8) The Kigali Amendment, which has been ratified by 100 parties, entered into force on January 1, 2019.
(9) Adoption of the Kigali Amendment and United States' ratification of and compliance with the Kigali Amendment is supported broadly by affected industry stakeholders and environmental public interest organizations.
(10) Industries in the United States that use and produce fluorocarbons--
(A) contribute more than $158,000,000,000 annually in goods and services to the economy of the United States; and
(B) employ more than 700,000 individuals, with an annual industry-wide payroll of more than $32,000,000,000.
(11) Foreign competitors to United States chemical refrigerant and refrigeration equipment based and operating in countries that have ratified the Kigali Amendment and are implementing policies in compliance with the Kigali Amendment are gaining an advantage on United States based industries in the manufacturing and used of next-generation chemicals and equipment.
(12) The United States' ratification of the Kigali Amendment--
(A) would support and promote the technological leadership of the United States' industries to lead global production and marketing of replacement refrigerants and equipment in compliance with the Kigali Amendment; and
(B) according to industry analysis, would potentially create approximately 33,000 new manufacturing jobs in the United States and add approximately $12,500,000,000 per year to the economy of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should immediately submit the Kigali Amendment to the Senate for advice and consent; and
(2) the Senate should promptly provide its advice and consent on the Kigali Amendment.
SEC. 204.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CARBON OFFSET AND REDUCTION SCHEME FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promulgate regulations establishing uniform policies and take other necessary actions to implement the terms of the Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (commonly known as ``CORSIA''), which was adopted by International Civil Aviation Organization in October 2016 as Assembly Resolution A39-3, and any amendments to such Resolution with which the United States concurs, as means to secure a single global carbon emissions market-based mechanism to facilitate the participation of operators of civil aircraft of the United States in international aviation.
SEC. 205.
SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS.
(a) Definitions.--
In this section:
(1) High-GWP hfc.--
The term ``high-GWP HFC'' means newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential calculated over a 100-year period of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2) Short-lived climate pollutants.--
The term ``short-lived climate pollutants'' means--
(A) black carbon;
(B) methane; and
(C) high-GWP HFC.
(b) In General.--
The President shall direct the United States representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences (including the United Nations Environment Programme, the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the Arctic Council, the Group of 7, the Group of 20, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Arctic Council, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition on Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, and the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such body or conference--
(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce short-lived climate pollutants;
(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products to replace sources of short-lived climate pollutants;
(3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
(A) to increase production and distribution of clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and products that will replace sources of short-lived climate pollutants;
(B) to develop action plans to mitigate short-lived climate pollutants from various private sector operations;
(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and management practices for reducing short-lived climate pollutants;
(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the incremental costs associated with mitigating short-live climate pollutants; and
(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop markets, as appropriate, for short-lived climate pollutants trading, capture, and other efforts that support economic growth using low and zero carbon energy sources;
(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions, including--
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
(B) the implementation of policies requiring industrial and agricultural best practices for capturing or mitigating the release of methane from extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and
(C) climate assessment, scientific research, monitoring, and technological development activities;
(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects described in paragraph (4); and (6) engage international partners in an existing multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve global cooperation for--
(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating efforts to reduce short-lived climate pollutants;
(B) developing and implementing best practices for phasing out sources of short-lived climate pollutants, including expanding capacity for innovative instruments to mitigate short-lived climate pollutants at the national and subnational levels of foreign countries, particularly countries with little capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deploy clean energy facilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies to advance such development;
(C) encouraging the development of standards and practices, and increasing transparency and accountability efforts for the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants;
(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems into industrial processes;
(E) fostering research to improve scientific understanding of--
(i) how high concentrations of short-lived climate pollutants affect human health, safety, and our climate;
(ii) changes in the amount and regional concentrations of black carbon and methane emissions, based on scientific modeling and forecasting;
(iii) effective means to sequester short-lived climate pollutants; and
(iv) other related areas of research the United States representatives deem necessary;
(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international finance organizations--
(i) to prioritize efforts to combat short-lived climate pollutants; and
(ii) to enhance transparency by providing sufficient and adequate information to facilitate independent verification of their climate finance reporting;
(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council (including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane;
(H) collaborating on technological advances in short-lived climate pollutant mitigation, sequestration and reduction technologies; and
(I) advising foreign countries, at both the national and subnational levels, regarding the development and execution of regulatory policies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation and the collection and safe management of short-lived climate pollutants.
(c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of United States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.--
(1) Finding.--
Congress recognizes the success of the United States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction programs and strategies established by the Environmental Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
(2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign partnerships.--
The Secretary of State shall work with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign countries and to support international efforts to reduce short-lived climate pollutants and combat climate change.
(d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and Reassertion of Targets in Existing Agreements.--
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress that--
(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new international agreements, new targets within existing international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally short-lived climate pollutants to support the efforts described in subsection (b);
(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such agreements;
(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016 North American Leaders' Summit; and
(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for Action.
(e) Consideration of Short-lived Climate Pollutants in Negotiating International Agreements.--In negotiating any relevant [[Page S2022]] international agreement with any country or countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(1) consider the impact short-lived climate pollutants are having on the increase in global average temperatures and the resulting global climate change;
(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on the environment; and
(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to eliminate short-lived climate pollutants from such country or countries.
SEC. 206.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING CLEAN TRANSPORTATION AND SUSTAINABLE LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Findings.--
Congress finds the following:
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and other land use accounted for 24 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions during 2010, which--
(A) is caused primarily from agriculture (cultivation of crops and livestock) and deforestation; and
(B) does not take into account the carbon dioxide that ecosystems remove from the atmosphere by sequestering carbon in biomass, dead organic matter, and soils, which offset approximately 20 percent of emissions from this sector.
(2) The transportation sector accounts for 14 percent of global gas emissions and 28 percent of the United States' greenhouse gas emissions.
(3) According to the National Center for Biotechnology Information's report, ``National Mitigation Potential from Natural Climate Solutions in the Tropics'
'--(A) better land stewardship is needed to achieve the Paris Agreement's temperature goal of holding the increase of global average temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius, particularly in the tropics;
(B) as countries enhance their nationally determined contributions, confusion persists about the potential contribution of better land stewardship to meeting such goal;
(C) in 50 percent of the tropical countries, cost-effective natural climate solutions could mitigate more than 50 percent of national emissions;
(D) in more than 25 percent of the tropical countries, cost effective natural climate solutions potential is greater than national emissions; and
(E) natural climate solutions can transform national economies and contribute to sustainable development goals.
(4) According to the International Energy Agency
--(A) global transport emissions increased by less than 0.5 percent in 2019 (compared with an average annual increase of 1.9 percent since 2000), owing to efficiency improvements, electrification, and greater use of biofuels;
(B) transportation is responsible for 24 percent of direct carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion;
(C) electric car deployment has grown rapidly since 2010, with the global stock of electric passenger cars passing 5,000,000 in 2018 (an increase of 63 percent from the previous year);
(D) in 2018
-- (i) approximately 45 percent of all electric cars on the road were in China;
(ii) approximately 24 percent of such cars were in Europe; and
(iii) approximately 22 percent of such cars were in the United States;
(E) existing measures to increase efficiency and reduce energy demand must be deepened and extended for compliance with the Sustainable Development Scenario of the International Energy Agency's World Energy Model;
(F) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, emissions from aviation and shipping were increasing faster than all other transportation modes; and
(G) energy demand and emissions have continued to rise in all modes of road transport (cars, trucks, buses, and 2- and 3-wheelers), particularly in heavy-duty road freight transport, which account for 75 percent of global transportation sector emissions.
(5) The worldwide market share of sport utility vehicles rose 15 percentage points between 2014 and 2019, and now comprises 40 percent of the global light-duty vehicle market.
(6) China is the world's largest automobile market, with more than 23,700,000 light vehicles sold in China in 2018.
As China's road network rapidly continues to expand, the number of vehicle miles traveled per capita will most likely lead to growth in China's transportation sector carbon dioxide emissions.
(7) Even with India's advancement of policies to promote electric vehicles and biofuels
--(A) India relies heavily on oil, and comprises 29 percent of India's total energy consumption; (B) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, India was the world's fastest growing aviation market, with passenger numbers for domestic and international flights doubling since 2010;
(C) India is planning to build 100 new airports between 2020 and 2035, and industry analysts have projected up to 520,000,000 Indian air travelers annually by 2037; and
(D) the World Health Organization reports that 15 of the cities worldwide with the worst air pollution are in India, largely due to urban vehicle emissions.
(8) In 2013, Mexico became the first vehicle market in Latin America to establish fuel economy or carbon dioxide emissions standards.
(9) The Department of State, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency do not have a program in place to encourage other countries to adopt standards that are compatible with United States fuel economy and emissions standards.
(10) Many countries adopt European emissions standards rather than United States standards, in part because of European diplomatic engagement, disadvantaging United States automakers in international markets.
(b) Statement of Policy.
--It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and coordinate with foreign governments, civil society, international financial institutions, subnational communities, agribusiness and automobile industry leaders, and the private sector in a concerted effort
--(1) to raise awareness of
--(A) the greenhouse gas emission contributions from agriculture, forestry, other land uses, and the transportation sector to the annual total of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions globally; and
(B) the importance of working cooperatively on the development of multi-faceted and country specific policies and strategies
--(i) to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, forestry, other land uses, and the transportation sector; and
(ii) to promote economic growth, opportunities, sustainable land management, and equitable access to mobility, transportation services, and resources among all populations;
(2) to mitigate land use sector emissions through enhanced land use planning, sustainable agriculture practices, sustainable forest management, and community-led conservation and development and other natural climate solutions;
(3) to use the voice and vote of the United States in multilateral institutions to advance international efforts to advance sustainable land-use planning, climate-smart agriculture, sustainable forest management, and community-led conservation and development;
(4) to improve the reliability and sustainability of transportation systems, particularly in developing countries, through a focus on mitigating carbon emissions, improving health and safety outcomes through improved land use and community design, and improved mobility for all populations;
(5) to promote collaboration regarding international research and development in
--(A) zero-emission vehicles;
(B) sustainable urban development and smart growth; and
(C) advanced low carbon biofuels for transportation;
(6) to facilitate and support the ability of parties to the Paris Agreement to more accurately monitor, record, and report transportation sector emissions;
(7) to develop greater cooperation among parties for strengthening the rules and ambition of the Paris Agreement's mitigation targets for transportation sector emissions;
(8) to improve the structural integrity of critical transportation infrastructure to withstand current and forecasted effects of climate change and support community resilience, improved access to jobs, and adaptability to the effects of climate change; and
(9) to explore new opportunities or seek enhanced initiatives within existing multilateral and bilateral agreements to develop mechanisms and policies for reducing transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions.
(c) International Cooperation.
--In implementing the policy described in subsection (b), the President should direct the United States representatives to appropriate international bodies to use the influence of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such body
--(1) promote transportation sector investment in
--(A) electric vehicles and other low and zero carbon transportation technologies; and
(B) sustainable land use development that incorporates
--(i) multi-modal transportation designs aimed at reducing
--(I) traffic congestion;
(II) carbon emissions from motor vehicles;
(III) travel times between high volume destinations within a community;
(IV) vehicle crashes and other threats to motorist and pedestrian safety; and
(V) stormwater runoff from impervious road surfaces, vehicle conflicts with wildlife, habitat destruction, and other forms of environmental degradation commonly associated with roads and motor vehicles;
(ii) multi-use community designs and dense development that accounts for locating residential development near essential goods, services, and job opportunities (to reduce individual reliance of motorized personal transportation);
(iii) transportation systems designed
-- (I) to maximize the safety of all users; and
(II) to reduce the probability of motorized vehicle crashes, including motorized vehicle crashes that injure or kill pedestrians and bicyclists;
(2) strive to improve mobility by advancing equitable access to transportation services among all populations, particularly historically underserved or marginalized populations and communities;
(3) improve environmental quality and community health outcomes through
-- [[Page S2023]] (A) safer and more efficient multi-modal transportation systems that reduce vehicle pollution and congestion;
(B) reductions in the amount of impervious surfaces; and
(C) integration of safe pedestrian and bicycling infrastructure;
(4) addresses unique transportation and economic needs of countries' diverse populations and communities in ways that also support a country's achievement of ambitious greenhouse gas mitigation commitments;
(5) enhance coordination and engagement with private sector stakeholders;
(6) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory authorities and governments to remove barriers to investment in transportation systems, infrastructure and electric vehicles and low and zero carbon fuels; and
(7) use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of such projects.
(d) Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO2 Emissions Diplomacy Initiative.
--(1) Development.
--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop a Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO2 Emissions Diplomacy Initiative to promote the worldwide adoption of vehicle fuel economy and vehicle carbon dioxide emissions standards that are compatible with United States standards.
(2) Responsibilities and duties.
--(A) Diplomatic efforts
.--The Secretary of State shall lead diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to adopt vehicle fuel economy standards and vehicle carbon dioxide emissions standards.
(B) Technical assistance.
--The Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall provide technical assistance to other countries to help such countries to develop new standards, testing regimes, and compliance strategies.
(3) Program scope.
--The Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO2 Emissions Diplomacy Initiative should
--(A) have the goal of reducing oil consumption by at least 2,000,000 barrels per day by 2030, in addition to the reduction anticipated by the implementation of standards in existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
(B) include input in developing the program from leaders in United States industry; and
(C) focus special attention on Latin America.
SEC. 207.
SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES REENGAGEMENT WITH THE GROUP OF SEVEN AND THE GROUP OF TWENTY ON CLIMATE ACTION.
(a) Findings.
--Congress finds the following:
(1) President Trump has abstained from several heads of state meetings on climate action and cooperation with the heads of state from countries comprising the Group of Seven (referred to in this section as the ``G7'') and the Group of Twenty (referred to in this section as the ``G20'').
(2) The G7 summit held in Charlevoix, Quebec in June 2018 produced a climate action communique that was signed by the heads of state from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, but was not signed by the United States.
(3) The G7 climate action communique states, ``Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union reaffirm their strong commitment to implement the Paris Agreement, through ambitious climate action, in particular through reducing emissions while stimulating innovation, enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening and financing resilience and reducing vulnerability; as well as ensuring a just transition, including increasing efforts to mobilize climate finance from a wide variety of sources.''.
(4) In 2019, the United States blocked the G7 from making any new or additional commitments on climate change, to the expressed disappointment and frustration of the other six heads of state.
(5) The G7, without the active participation of the United States, continues to work together to fulfill clean energy commitments on initiatives such as the 2014 Rome Initiative for Energy Security, the 2015 Hamburg Initiative for Sustainable Energy Security, the 2016 Kitakyushu Initiative on Energy Security for Global Growth, and the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative.
However, United States objections to global cooperative climate action have prevented the G7 from undertaking new clean energy and climate action initiatives in recent years.
(6) The 2018 Buenos Aires Leaders Declaration by the G20
--(A) recognizes the risks that climate change poses to global security, global health, and economic development; and
(B) affirms the significance of the Paris Agreement.
(7) The United States insisted on the inclusion of a statement in the G20 Buenos Aires Leaders Declaration, for which the United States was the only subscriber, expressing dissenting opinions on international climate action cooperation and equivocation on ``utilizing all energy sources and technologies, while protecting the environment''.
(8) In 2019, the G20 narrowly avoided concluding without a leaders' declaration, when the President unsuccessfully tried to pressure the other 19 heads of state to weaken commitments on combating climate change in the 2019 G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration, leaving the United States to provide a dissenting provision articulating its outlier position on climate action in the Declaration.
(b) In General.
--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of State, shall initiate a China-focused agenda at the G7, with respect to
--(1) trade and investment issues and enforcement;
(2) establishing and promulgating international infrastructure standards;
(3) the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong;
(4) human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other areas in the People's Republic of China;
(5) the security of 5G telecommunications;
(6) anti-competitive behavior;
(7) coercive and indentured international finance and conditional provision of foreign assistance;
(8) international influence campaigns;
(9) climate change;
(10) China's domestic and international investments in new coal power plants;
(11) environmental standards; and
(12) coordination with like-minded regional partners, including the Republic of Korea and Australia.
(c) Briefing on Progress of Negotiations.
--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the progress of any negotiations described in subsection (b).
(d) Sense of Congress.
--It is the sense of Congress that the United States should
--(1) in the next G7 communique and G20 Leaders' Declaration
--(A) renounce the United States contrarian positions on climate change expressed in the 2018 and 2019 official documents of the G7 and G20 summits;
(B) renew its commitment to climate cooperation and support for fulfilling the goals of the Paris Agreement in the context of the G7 and the G20;
(C) lead efforts to formalize new mechanisms and commitments to climate action cooperation between the heads of state of the G7 and of the G20, which are aimed at
--(i) increasing ambition on greenhouse gas mitigation; and
(ii) strengthening support for climate finance in developing countries, particularly countries that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(D) challenge the heads of state of the G7 and the G20 to leverage private financing and increase grants and official development assistance in clean energy and sustainable development projects in their own countries and in developing countries, especially countries that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(2) initiate the China-focused agenda described in subsection (b) at the G7.
TITLE II
I--CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT
SEC. 301.
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, MITIGATION, AND SECURITY PROGRAM.
(a) Definitions.
--In this section:
(1) Convention.
--The term ``Convention'' means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(2) Most vulnerable communities and populations
.--The term ``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means communities and populations that are at risk of substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to respond to such effects, including women, impoverished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and formal and informal workers.
(3) Most vulnerable developing countries.
--The term ``most vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, developing countries that are at risk of substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches included in any international treaties and agreements.
(4) Program.
--The term ``Program'' means the International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program established pursuant to subsection (c).
(b) Purpose.
--The purpose of this section is to provide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, in support of host country driven projects, planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host countries
--(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while facilitating the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and forecasted effects of climate change; and
(3) to employ
--(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; and [[Page S2024]]
(B) agricultural production practices that reduce poverty while improving soil health, protecting water quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.
(c) Establishment of Program.
--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a program, to be known as the ``International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program'', to provide bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, projects, and activities described in subsection (e).
(d) Supplement Not Supplant.
--Assistance provided under this section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities that fit the characteristics of the Program.
(e) Policy.
--It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure that the Program provides resources to developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such countries, to support the development and implementation of programs, projects, and activities that
--(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration and deployment of clean energy, which may include transmission, distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while facilitating the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
(2) advance the use of clean energy technologies facing financial or other barriers to widespread deployment that could be addressed through support under the Program to reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and development of transportation networks and land use practices that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
(4) support building capacities that may include
--(A) developing and implementing methodologies and programs for measuring and quantifying greenhouse gas emissions and verifying emissions mitigation, including building capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;
(B) assessing, developing, and implementing technology and policy options for greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions, including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation strategies;
(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and related institutions in developing countries to improve the deployment of clean energy technologies and practices, including through increased transparency;
(D) training and instruction regarding the installation and maintenance of renewable energy technologies; and
(E) activities that support the development and implementation of frameworks for intellectual property rights in developing countries;
(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and adaptation capacities in response to and in spite of the effects of climate change;
(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean energy, with full labor protections in accordance with international labor standards;
(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience capacities of communities to the effects of climate change, including effects on
--(A) water availability;
(B) agricultural productivity and food security;
(C) flood risk;
(D) coastal resources;
(E) biodiversity;
(F) economic livelihoods;
(G) health and diseases;
(H) housing and shelter; and
(I) human migration;
(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the environment through enhanced community planning,preparedness, and growth strategies that take into account current and forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;
(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of climate change such as extreme weather;
(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance to support vulnerable developing countries and communities adapt their economies, communities, and security planning efforts to the effects of climate change;
(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies, including through improvements to make critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures, including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures, that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors of developing countries;
(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry practices;
(14) promote sustainable land use activities, including supporting development planning, design, and construction with respect to transportation systems and land use that incorporates
--(A) multi-modal transportation designs aimed at reducing
--(i) traffic congestion;
(ii) carbon emissions from motor vehicles;
(iii) travel times between high volume destinations within a community;
(iv) motor vehicle crashes and other threats to motorist and pedestrian safety; and
(v) stormwater runoff from impervious road surfaces, motor vehicle conflicts with wildlife, habitat destruction, and other forms of environmental degradation commonly associated with roads and motor vehicles;
(B) multi-use community designs and dense development that account for locating residential development near essential goods, services, and job opportunities to reduce individual reliance on motorized personal transportation;
(C) transportation systems designed to
--(i) maximize the safety of all users;
(ii) improve mobility by advancing equitable access to transportation services among all populations, particularly historically underserved or marginalized populations and communities; and
(iii) reduce the probability of vehicle crashes and pedestrian and bicyclist injuries and mortalities;
(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and water security of communities;
(16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and nongovernmental international development organizations to assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection (b);
(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional nationally determined contributions of those countries;
(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage private sector financing in
--(A) clean energy;
(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource management; and
(C) the transportation sector as described in paragraph(3); and
(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural carbon sinks.
(f) Provision of Assistance.
--(1) In general.
--The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development(USAID), under the direction of the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall provide assistance under the Program
--(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to the requirements under subsection (g);
(B) to multilateral funds or international institutions with programs for climate mitigation or adaptation in developing countries consistent with the policy described in subsection (e); or
(C) through a combination of the mechanisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) Limitation.
--(A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds or international institutions.
--In any fiscal year, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, under the direction of the Secretary of State, may provide up to 40 percent of the assistance available to carry out the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or international institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph (B).
(B) Multilateral fund or international institution eligibility.
--A multilateral fund or international institution is eligible to receive assistance under subparagraph (A)
--(i) if
--(I) such fund or institution is established pursuant to
--(aa) the Convention; or
(bb) an agreement negotiated under the Convention; or
(II) the assistance is directed to 1 or more multilateral funds or international development institutions, pursuant to an agreement negotiated under the Convention; and
(ii) if such fund or institution
--(I) specifies the terms and conditions under which the United States is to provide assistance to the fund or institution, and under which the fund or institution is to provide assistance to recipient countries;
(II) ensures that assistance from the United States to the fund or institution and the principal and income of the fund or institution are disbursed only
--(aa) to support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection (b);
(bb) consistent with the policy described in subsection(e); and [[Page S2025]]
(cc) in regular consultation with relevant governing bodies of the fund or institution that
-- (AA) include representation from countries among the most vulnerable developing countries; and
(BB) provide public access.
(C) Congressional notification.
--The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before providing assistance to a multilateral fund or international institution under this subsection.
(3) Local consultations.
--Programs, projects, and activities supported by assistance provided under this subsection shall require consultations with local communities, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of information, public participation, consultation, and the free prior and informed consent of such peoples, including full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local communities.
(g) Bilateral Assistance.
--(1) In general.
--Except to the extent inconsistent with this subsection, the administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the implementation of such Act in order to provide the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development with the authority to provide assistance to countries, including the most vulnerable developing countries, for programs, projects, and activities consistent with the purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy described in subsection (e).
(2) Considerations.
--In carrying out this subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that
-- (A) the environmental impact of proposed programs, projects, and activities is assessed through adequate consultation, public participation, and disclosure of information; and
(B) programs, projects, and activities under this subsection
--(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the maximum extent practicable; and
(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent practicable, with broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural resource management objectives and initiatives in the recipient country.
(3) Community engagement.
--The Administrator shall seek to ensure that
--(A) local communities, particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in areas in which any programs, projects, or activities are carried out under this subsection, are engaged in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such programs, projects, and activities through disclosure of information, public participation, and consultation; and
(B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable communities and populations are addressed in national or regional climate change adaptation plans.
(4) Consultation and disclosure.
--For each country receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure of information to, local, national, and international stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities carried out under this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.
--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.
SEC. 302.
UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.
(a) United States Contributions.
--On behalf of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary ofState
-- (1) shall jointly coordinate contributions to the Green Climate Fund; and
(2) may contribute to the Green Climate Fund, in addition to the amounts authorized under subsection (d), additional amounts from other relevant foreign assistance accounts.
(b) Limits on Country Access.
--The Secretary of the Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that
-- (1) the Fund does not provide more than approximately 15 percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country;
(2) each country that receives amounts from the Fund submits to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan that describes how
-- (A) energy efficiency or production projects will achieve significant and lasting reductions in national-level greenhouse gas emissions; and
(B) adaptation projects will
--(i) provide long-term enhancements to national and food security;
(ii) protect lives and livelihoods;
(iii) ensure lasting access to freshwater resources; or
(iv) advance public health outcomes; and
(3) in the case of a country that is not classified by the World Bank as having a low-income economy, provides for not less than 15 percent of the total cost of the plan to be contributed from the public funds of the country.
(c) Project and Program Requirements.
--The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to ensure that support from the Fund is used exclusively to support the deployment by developing countries of clean energy technologies and the development of projects that improve the resilience capacities and ability of countries to adapt to the effects of climate change, including, as appropriate, through the provision of technical support or support for policy or institutional reforms.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.
--In addition to the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 301(h), there are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund
-- (1) $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
(2) $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(3) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; and
(4) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.
(e) Report to Congress.
--Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing
--(1) the purpose of and progress on each project supported by the Fund; and
(2) how each such project furthers the investment plan described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the project is implemented.
SEC. 303.
SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENTS AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.
(a) Findings
.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2020, the World Economic Forum (referred to in this section as the ``WEF'') in Davos, Switzerland, put addressing the climate crisis at the top of its agenda. World and business leaders reinforced the need for urgent action to avoid human destruction from the clear and present climate crisis.
(2) At the 2020 annual meeting of the WEF, the President, accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, delivered a contrarian message, claiming, ``To embrace the possibilities of tomorrow, we must reject the perennial prophets of doom and their predictions of the apocalypse.''
(3) Nevertheless, the WEF, without support from the United States, announced climate initiatives on sustainable markets, reaching carbon neutrality on insurance investment portfolios, decarbonizing the automotive sector through circular economies, and transitioning to healthier, more sustainable food systems.
(4) The one initiative the United States did agree to join is the Trillion Tree Campaign, which aims to grow, restore, and conserve 1 trillion trees by 2030.
(5) The President's dismissal of the threat climate change poses to economic growth and global security has isolated the United States from the 117 represented countries at the WEF that support its climate agenda and are accelerating their national commitments in other international fora to address climate change.
(b) Sense of Congress.
--It is the sense of Congress that at the 2021 WEF, or at an appropriate time and venue as early as possible in 2021
--(1) the Secretary of State should commit to restoring diplomatic engagement and cooperation on mobilizing investment and support for growing the global economy while achieving net zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(2) the Secretary of the Treasury should announce
--(A) the intention of the United States Government to divest from future investment and support for fossil fuel energy and extraction projects in developing countries; and
(B) the establishment of an international clean energy private finance fund to support the development of large-scale renewable energy projects in middle income countries;
(3) the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should commit to
--(A) divesting the United States International Development Finance Corporation from future fossil fuel energy development and extraction projects; and
(B) investing a significant portion of the annual portfolio of the United States International Development Finance Corporation in clean energy development projects; and
(4) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should commit to prioritizing building resilience and adaption capacities in the most climate-vulnerable countries.
SEC. 304.
CLEAN ENERGY AND THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
(a) In General.
--Section 1451 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9671) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(j) Clean Energy.
-- ``(1) Report required.
--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
-- ``(A) highlighting the substantial commitment of the Corporation to invest in renewable and other clean energy technologies;
``(B) setting forth
--``(i) a plan to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects [[Page S2026]] and subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio, as required by paragraph (2); and
``(ii) a plan for facilitating the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to clean, low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities, as required by paragraph (3); and
``(C) detailing the efforts of the Corporation to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects and subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio, including a full accounting of the reductions, achieved in accordance with the plan described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
-- ``(A) In general.
--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a climate change mitigation plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects and subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio by, relative to October 1, 2020
-- ``(i) not less than 60 percent by 2025; and
``(ii) 100 percent by 2028.
``(B) Implementation.
--The Corporation shall begin implementation of the plan required by subparagraph (A) not later than 20 days after submitting the plan to the appropriate congressional committees.
``(C) Report required.
--Not later than one year after the date on which the Corporation begins implementation under subparagraph (B) of the plan required by subparagraph (A), and every 2 years thereafter until the Corporation achieves the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects and subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio by 100 percent, the Corporation shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the Corporation's progress and efforts to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals of the plan.
``(3) Clean electricity transition.
--The Corporation shall seek, in providing support for projects under title II, to facilitate the transition in key global markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to clean, low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and communities, by
--``(A) enabling the phase-out of uneconomic coal-fired power plants that are shielded from competition from renewable energy sources by noncompetitive market structures such as long-term contracts and regulated tariffs;
``(B) using low-cost capital
--``(i) to refinance existing debt on uneconomic coal-fired power plants;
``(ii) to reinvest in renewable energy sources to replace such plants;
``(iii) to support a just transition to renewable energyfor affected workers and communities by generating decen jobs that adhere to international labor standards all alon the renewable energy supply chain; an
``(iv) to support the upgrading of jobs and skills as well as job creation and improved productivity in more labor- intensive industries that offer employment opportunities on a wide scale; and
``(C) considering
--``(i) competitive approaches, like reverse auctions, to ensure the best value in investing in renewable energy sources; and
``(ii) partnering, as appropriate, with
-- ``(I) the United States Agency for International Development; and
``(II) the Department of the Treasury with respect to efforts by multilateral development banks (as defined in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))).''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.
--Section 7079(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-117; 123 Stat. 3396 is amended by striking ``comment:'' and all that follows and inserting ``comment.''.
SEC. 305.
CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) Sense of Congress.
--It is the sense of Congress that the strength and credibility of United States climate policy is undermined when there is a lack of consistency between the policies and practices implemented at the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the policies and practices the Corporation promotes at the international financial institutions.
(b) Enhancing Transparency at Multilateral Development Banks
.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to advocate for enhancing transparency by providing sufficient and adequate information to facilitate independent verification of the climate finance reporting of the institution.
(c) Policy Alignment.
--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States
--(1) to challenge policy-based loans or lending through financial intermediaries that directly or indirectly supports fossil fuels; and
(2) to seek to ensure that all loans, grants, policies, and strategies of the institution are aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
(d) Prohibition.
--Section 1451 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9671), as amended by section 304, is further amended by adding at the end the following:
``(k) Consistency in Environmental and Social Policies.
-- The Corporation may not adopt any environmental or social policy that provides less protection for communities and the environment than the level of protection required under title XIII of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262m et seq.).''.
(e) International Financial Institution Defined.
--In this section, the term ``international financial institution'' has the meaning given that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
TITLE IV
--CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SEC. 401.
ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
(a) Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources.
--Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended
--(1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) Assistant secretary of state for energy resources.
-- ``(A) Authorization for assistant secretary.
--Subject to the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1), there is authorized to be established in the Department of State an Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources.
``(B) Personnel.
--The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources, and in accordance with the authorization under subparagraph (A), shall ensure that sufficient personnel are dedicated to energy matters within the Bureau of Energy Resources in order
--``(i) to formulate and implement international policies, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, aimed at protecting and advancing United States energy security interests and international energy development and access to electricity, in accordance with the United Nation's sustainable development goals in ways that ensure responsible development of global energy resources by effectively managing United States bilateral and multilateral relations;
``(ii) to ensure that analyses of public health and national security implications of global energy and environmental developments are reflected in the decision-making process within the Department of State;
``(iii) to incorporate energy security and clean energy development priorities into the activities of the Department related to matters involving global energy development, accounting for the effects global energy development has on
-- ``(I) United States national security;
``(II) quality of life and public health of people, households, and communities, particularly vulnerable and underserved populations affected by, or proximate to, energy development, transmission, and distribution projects;
``(III) United States economic interests;
``(IV) emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change; and
``(V) local and regional land use, air and water quality, and risks to public health of communities described in subclause (II);
``(iv) to coordinate energy activities within the Department of State and with relevant Federal departments and agencies;
``(v) to work internationally
--``(I) to support socially and environmentally responsible development of energy resources that mitigate carbon emissions, and the distribution of such resources for the benefit of the United States and United States allies and trading partners for their energy security, climate security, and economic development needs;
``(II) to promote
--``(aa) the availability of clean energy technologies, including carbon capture and storage;
``(bb) energy sector innovation;
``(cc) well-functioning global markets for clean energy resources and technologies;
``(dd) expertise for the benefit of the United States and United States allies and trading partners;
``(III) to resolve international disputes regarding the exploration, development, production, or distribution of energy resources;
``(IV) to support the economic, security, and commercial interests of United States persons operating in the energy markets of foreign countries; and
``(V) to support and coordinate international efforts
--``(aa) to alleviate energy poverty;
``(bb) to protect vulnerable, exploited, and underserved populations that are affected or displaced by energy development projects;
``(cc) to account for and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from energy development projects;
``(dd) to promote fair labor practices, labor protections for workers, and training for and access to good-paying jobs within the clean energy sector; and
``(ee) to increase access to clean energy for vulnerable and underserved communities;
``(vi) to lead the United States commitment to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; and
``(vii) to coordinate energy security and climate security and other relevant functions within the Department of State undertaken as of the date of the enactment of this paragraph by
-- [[Page S2027]]
``(I) the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs;
``(II) the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and
``(III) other offices within the Department of State.''.
(b) Elimination of Authority for Coordinator for International Energy Affairs
.--Section 931 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17371) is amended
--(1) by striking subsections (a) and (b); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively.
SEC. 402.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIMACY FOR ENERGY DIPLOMACY.
(a) In General.
--The Department of State shall have primacy for all United States diplomatic engagements with regard to international energy affairs.
(b) Interagency Coordination.
--The Secretary of State, as appropriate, shall coordinate with and use the technical expertise and resources of the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, and other relevant Federal agencies and departments in the planning and execution of United States foreign policy goals and objectives related to international energy affairs.
SEC. 403.
REPORTS ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN MISSION INNOVATION AND THE CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL.
(a) Mission Innovation.
--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that details the scope and nature of United States participation in Mission Innovation, including
--(1) who in the United States Government serves as the lead for Mission Innovation;
(2) what objectives the United States has used Mission Innovation to advance;
(3) what partnerships the United States has established through Mission Innovation and the date on which any partnerships the United States brokered were announced;
(4) how the United States has leveraged Mission Innovation to engage in technology transfer arrangements with foreign governments;
(5) how the United States has attracted private sector entities to contribute to and participate in Mission Innovation;
(6) the total amount of funding provided by the United States Government to Mission Innovation each year since the establishment of Mission Innovation; and
(7) the outline of a strategic engagement plan and objectives for delivering new energy technology innovation outcomes through Mission Innovation.
(b) Clean Energy Ministerial.
--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that details the scope and nature of United States participation in the Clean Energy Ministerial, including
-- (1) the number of Clean Energy Ministerial meetings that the Secretary of Energy has participated in;
(2) the diplomatic objectives, including with respect to energy technologies and private sector entities, that the United States has aimed to promote within the Clean Energy Ministerial;
(3) the consensus initiatives, if any, among the chiefs of party to the Clean Energy Ministerial that the United States objected to, refused to join, or refrained from contributing to the development of; and
(4) a plan for restoring United States leadership in using the Clean Energy Ministerial to promote the development and deployment of renewable energy and carbon mitigation technologies from the energy and transportation sectors.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress.
--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means
--(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 404.
REDUCED DEFORESTATION.
(a) Definitions.
--In this section:
(1) Administrator.
--Except as otherwise expressly provided, the term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.
(2) Deforestation.
--The term ``deforestation'' means a change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any other land use.
(3) Developing country.
--The term ``developing country'' means a country eligible to receive official development assistance according to the income guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
(4) Emissions reductions.
--The term ``emissions reductions'' means greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved from reduced or avoided deforestation under this section.
(5) Forest.
--(A) In general.
--The term ``forest'' means a terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests, comprised of native tree species generated and maintained primarily through natural ecological and evolutionary processes.
(B) Exclusion.
--The term ``forest'' does not include plantations, such as crops of trees planted by humans primarily for the purposes of harvesting.
(6) Forest degradation.
--The term ``forest degradation'' is any reduction in the carbon stock of a forest due to the effects of human land-use activities, including such land-use activities on peatlands.
(7) Human rights defender.
--The term ``human rights defender'' means an individual, group, or association that peacefully contributes to the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals, including in relation to mass, flagrant, or systematic such violations, such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination or occupation, aggression or threats to national sovereignty, national unity, or territorial integrity, and the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination and the right of every people to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources.
(8) Intact forest.
--The term ``intact forest'' means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global extent of forest cover that
--(A) covers an area of at least 500 square kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each direction; and
(B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems minimally influenced by human economic activity and large enough that all native biodiversity, including viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be maintained.
(9) Leakage.
--The term ``leakage'' means the unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement of activities in a project area to areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emissions.
(10) Leakage prevention activities.
--The term ``leakage prevention activities'' means activities in developing countries that are directed at preserving existing forest carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.
(11) National deforestation reduction activities.
--The term .
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